Does the TPP work for workers? by MacEwen, Angella & Macdonald, L. (Laura)
RESEARCHwww.policyalternatives.ca ANALYSIS SOLUTIONS
Does the TPP work 
for workers?
Analyzing the labour chapter of the TPP






Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives
July 2016
About the Authors
Angella MacEwen is an economist with the Cana-
dian Labour Congress, a research associate with 
the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, and a 
policy fellow with the Broadbent Institute. She has 
an undergraduate degree in international develop-
ment studies from Saint Mary’s University in Hali-
fax, and a master’s degree in economics from Dal-
housie University. Her areas of expertise include 
international trade and economic development, 
labour market issues, and social policy analysis.
Laura Macdonald is a professor in the department of 
political science and the Institute of Political Econ-
omy at Carleton University. She has published nu-
merous articles in journals and edited collections 
on such issues as the role of non-governmental 
organizations in development, global civil socie-
ty, citizenship struggles in Latin America, Canadi-
an development assistance, and the political im-
pact of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) on human rights and democracy in the 
three member states. 
Acknowledgments
In preparing this paper, the authors received help-
ful comments from Robert Finbow, Mark Rowlin-
son, and Kimberley Nolan. The authors also wish 
to thank the CCPA staff who assisted with this pa-
per, including Stuart Trew, Scott Sinclair, and Tim 
Scarth for his work on layout.
Isbn 978-1-77125-299-7
This report is available free of charge at www.
policyalternatives.ca. Printed copies may be or-
dered through the CCPA National Office for $10.
PleAse mAke A donAtIon...  
Help us to continue to offer our  
publications free online.
With your support we can continue to produce high 
quality research — and make sure it gets into the hands 
of citizens, journalists, policy makers and progres-
sive organizations. Visit www.policyalternatives.ca 
or call 613-563-1341 for more information.
The CCPA is an independent policy research organ-
ization. This report has been subjected to peer re-
view and meets the research standards of the Centre.
The opinions and recommendations in this report, 
and any errors, are those of the authors, and do 
not necessarily reflect the views of the funders 
of this report.
5 Does the TPP work for workers?
5 Summary
6 From NAFTA to the TPP: Do labour clauses work?
9 Labour provisions since NAFTA




Does the TPP work for workers? 5
Does the TPP work 
for workers?
Analyzing the labour chapter of the TPP
Summary
Contemporary trade agreements commonly include a chapter on labour, or a 
labour side accord, which is supposed to guarantee that the agreement will 
not contribute to the tendency toward a “race to the bottom” in the global 
economy.1 For example, Chapter 19 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
treaty includes provisions that are supposed to ensure that “core labour 
standards,” as defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO), are 
respected by signatory states.2 Global Affairs Canada states:
The Agreement provides the opportunity to raise and improve labour stan-
dards and working conditions in TPP member countries through an ambi-
tious level of obligations to ensure that national labour laws and policies 
in partner countries respect international labour standards. Canada is com-
mitted to fundamental labour rights, and supporting high labour standards 
through a fully enforceable TPP Chapter is a key part of that commitment.3
This is not the view of labour federations from many of the participating 
TPP countries, as well as a range of human rights–focused non-government-
al organizations (NGOs) and academics, who argue the labour chapter fails 
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to provide sufficient tools to address labour rights violations — even where 
they are most apparent as in Brunei, Malaysia, Mexico, and Vietnam.4 The 
experience of workers under similar free trade agreements provides ample 
evidence to back this position.
The text of the TPP labour chapter is modelled on earlier labour accords 
or chapters starting with the labour side accord to the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the trade agreement Canadians are probably 
most familiar with. Since signing NAFTA, the United States and Canada have 
continued to promote labour provisions tied to trade agreements, and there 
has been some progress in making these provisions stronger. Nevertheless, 
like the NAFTA side accord, these agreements remain largely ineffective for 
addressing labour rights violations, and they fail to counteract the negative 
impacts on working people of other, stronger provisions in contemporary 
trade agreements. As the ILO pointed out recently, “no complaint has given 
rise to a decision of a dispute settlement body or even led to sanctions.”5
This study will first review the contentious history of labour provisions 
in recent free trade agreements to clarify the weaknesses of this approach 
as a tool to support labour rights. It then breaks down the TPP labour pro-
visions and their likely impact on working conditions and labour law.
From NAFTA to the TPP: Do labour clauses work?
It is helpful to look at the labour provisions in NAFTA, not just because this 
is the most important trade agreement that Canadians are subject to, but 
also because it has served as a model for other Canadian and U.S. FTAs in-
cluding the TPP. NAFTA was initially negotiated without a labour side accord 
or labour chapter within the agreement itself. The North American Agree-
ment on Labour Co-operation (NAALC) was a political response to the in-
tense opposition to NAFTA from labour unions and their allies in the United 
States. Canada, like Mexico, was a reluctant signatory to the NAALC. After 
his election in 1992, former president Clinton insisted on the inclusion of 
labour and environment side accords in NAFTA to appease opponents of 
the agreement and ensure its passage in Congress. According to the text of 
the NAALC, Canada, the United States, and Mexico committed to “improve 
working conditions and living standards in each Party’s territory,” and to 
promote, “to the maximum extent possible,” the 11 labour rights set out in 
an annex to the agreement.7
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The side-agreement approach had several key weaknesses. First, it 
meant the labour provisions could not be enforced through the same dis-
pute resolution processes in NAFTA itself. Secondly, the NAALC did not cre-
ate new common labour standards, but merely committed the members to 
enforce their own existing labour legislation. The agreement does mention 
some “guiding principles,” which mostly reflect standard ILO principles. 
However, the parties are just encouraged to promote these principles and 
Government summary of the TPP labour chapter6
• Contains enforceable commitments to protect and promote internationally recognized labour princi-
ples and rights.
• This includes the International Labour Organization’s (ILO’s) 1998 Declaration on Fundamen-
tal Principles and Rights at Work.
• Includes commitments to ensure that national laws and policies provide protection of the fundamen-
tal principles and rights at work, including:
• the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining; and
• the elimination of child labour, forced labour or compulsory labour, and of discrimination in re-
spect of employment and occupation.
• Ensures that laws provide acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, 
and occupational health and safety.
• Encourages co-operation on labour matters and encourages companies to adopt voluntary corporate 
social responsibility initiatives related to labour issues.
• Includes a non-derogation clause that prevents TPP parties from derogating from their domestic labour 
laws in order to encourage trade or investment.
• Includes structures to implement and monitor compliance with the commitments in the chapter:
• A party may request consultations with another party on any matter arising under the chapter 
in order to jointly decide on any course of action to address the matter.
• Establishes a mechanism through which members of the public can raise concerns about labour 
issues related to the chapter.
• Includes enforceable dispute settlement procedures in cases of non-compliance, to help ensure that all 
labour obligations are respected.
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not necessarily to enforce them.8 Thirdly, and most importantly, there were 
no effective sanctions attached to violations of the labour side agreement.
The NAALC established national administrative offices (NAOs) in the 
labour departments of each signatory state. Individuals, labour union lead-
ers, and human rights defenders from each of the three countries can file 
complaints about the behavior of one of the other states to their country’s 
NAO.9 If the NAO decides to accept a case for review, it begins a formal inves-
tigation, and may hold public hearings and issue a formal report. Different 
types of violation result in different types of punishment — from minister-
ial consultation, in the case of standards related to industrial organization 
(e.g., the right to strike), to possible trade sanctions in the case of submis-
sions that involve allegations of child labour, minimum wage disputes, or 
health and safety violations.10 A flurry of labour cases were submitted in the 
five years after the NAALC came into force. But their number dwindled af-
ter that to the point where today the agreement is rarely used. Trade unions 
and other workers’ rights advocates found that the formal complaint mech-
anism almost never resulted in ministerial consultations or sanctions.
The NAFTA countries also created a North American Commission for 
Labour Co-operation (NACLC), with a secretariat to be based in Washing-
ton, D.C. (later moved to Dallas, Texas), to oversee the labour side agree-
ment. Initially the NACLC would handle follow-up actions from NAFTA min-
isterial consultations, special research projects, and other trinational labour 
co-operation activities. The member states had so little commitment to the 
process that, as the number of complaints under the NAALC slowed, the 
secretariat eventually disappeared.
Not only are the sanctions for labour violations much weaker than those 
available in NAFTA to promote the interests of corporations and investors, 
the process for bringing cases to adjudication is long and cumbersome. 
NAOs report to the labour ministries in each country, and as such cannot 
guarantee impartiality. In the case of Canada, the effectiveness of the pro-
cess is further limited by the constitutional mandates of the provinces, as 
only five (Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Sco-
tia) have ratified the NAALC.11
In Mexico, the country where workers might have been expected to bene-
fit most from the labour side accord, systematic violations of labour rights 
abound in a broader context of widespread human rights violations that 
endangers labour and human rights activists and undermines the coun-
try’s system of industrial relations. Human rights violations have escalated 
rapidly in the country over the past 10 years, exemplified by the disappear-
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ance of 43 students from the teacher’s college in Ayotzinapa, Guerrero in 
2015. These young men are now presumed dead. As Amnesty International 
reported in its 2015–16 country assessment of Mexico:
Impunity persisted for grave human rights violations including torture and 
other ill treatment, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial executions. 
More than 27,000 people remained missing or disappeared. Human rights 
defenders and journalists continued to be threatened, harassed or killed. 
The number of detentions, deportations and complaints of abuse of irregular 
migrants by the authorities increased significantly. Violence against women 
continued to be widespread. Large-scale development and resource exploit-
ation projects were carried out without a legal framework regarding the 
free, prior and informed consent of Indigenous communities they affected.12
The most serious problem faced by Mexican trade unions is the failure 
of the Mexican government to enforce labour and other laws, particularly 
those around freedom of association and collective bargaining. Many work-
ers are “represented” by employer-dominated unions that sign collective 
agreements (so-called “protection contracts”) the workers themselves have 
never seen or ratified. Workers who attempt to form independent unions are 
frequently targeted by violence from employers and the employer-dominat-
ed unions, often with the collusion of state officials.
This situation has been the subject of public reports under the NAALC, 
but no trinational action has ever been taken.13 The ILO has also raised ser-
ious concerns about the threats to freedom of association in the country, 
which has not yet been addressed through any NAFTA mechanism. As a 
result, wages are artificially depressed, and more multinational corpora-
tions are moving operations to Mexico to take advantage of the systematic 
exploitation of Mexican workers — exactly the opposite of the higher stan-
dards that were promised when NAFTA was signed.
Labour provisions since NAFTA
Following NAFTA, U.S. trade unions and their Democratic allies in Con-
gress continued to push the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to 
strengthen the labour provisions in new free trade agreements. For example, 
the U.S.–Jordan and U.S.–Chile FTAs and the Dominican Republic–Central 
America Free Trade Agreement (DR–CAFTA) included labour provisions in 
the main text rather than in side agreements. U.S. concerns with DR-CAFTA 
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were particularly strong because of the serious labour and human rights vio-
lations in many of the five countries involved (Dominican Republic, El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua). As a result, signatory coun-
tries were required to provide a report on their current labour laws, list areas 
where improvement was needed, and report on progress every six months 
between 2007 and 2010.14
In this generation of U.S. labour agreements only one labour provision 
is enforceable through the same or similar dispute settlement mechanisms 
as for the rest of the FTA.15 Each party to these treaties agrees it “shall not 
fail to effectively enforce its labor laws...in a manner affecting trade between 
the Parties.” A petitioner must therefore show that a government did not 
enforce its labour laws before a case can be sent to dispute resolution. For 
a case to be successful at the dispute resolution stage, the petitioner would 
then need to prove the labour violation had an impact on trade between the 
two nations. (This is the same burden of proof required in the TPP labour 
chapter.) Failure to enforce labour laws was the basis for the first labour 
case pursued to the dispute settlement stage by the U.S. government in re-
sponse to a 2008 filing by U.S. and Guatemalan labour unions. It took sev-
en years for the case to be heard.
The most recent U.S. model of labour provisions in FTAs was established 
in the so-called May 10 Agreement, or Bipartisan Trade Deal.16 The most im-
portant provisions it sets out are that countries must adopt, maintain, and 
enforce the four fundamental rights named in the 1998 ILO Declaration, and 
that violations of the labour chapter are subject to the same dispute settle-
ment mechanism as other violations of U.S. FTAs. The TPP labour chapter is 
based on this model, which is also found in the U.S. FTAs with Peru (2009), 
Panama (2012), Colombia (2012), and South Korea (2012).
Since NAFTA, Canada has signed a series of trade agreements, mostly 
on a bilateral basis, which also contain labour co-operation agreements. 
The 1997 agreement with Chile was based closely on the NAFTA model. The 
2002 agreement with Costa Rica was similar but with an even more reduced 
system of enforcement. After this point, Canada began to include somewhat 
stronger language for labour rights. Newer agreements with Peru (2009), 
Colombia (2011), Jordan (2012), Panama (2013), and Honduras (2014) con-
tain an agreement to implement ILO standards, and specifically reference 
the 1998 ILO Declaration and the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda. The Canada–
South Korea agreement (2015) includes a labour chapter, rather than a side 
agreement on labour co-operation, but it does not specifically refer to the 
ILO Declaration, only to “internationally recognized labour rights.”
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Recent Canadian agreements also contain a clause that prohibits par-
ties from engaging in practices that derogate from domestic laws in order 
to encourage trade or investment. These agreements contain formal dispute 
settlement processes for cases involving violations of core labour rights, or 
where there exists a persistent pattern of failure to comply with domestic 
laws. In the agreements with Panama, Peru, and Colombia, however, fines 
are limited to US$15 million (about C$19 million), and are to be paid into a 
fund designed to implement the action plan.17 This limit on sanctions is in 
stark contrast with awards under investor–state dispute settlement cases, 
which have gone into the billions and there is no upper limit. Furthermore, 
the imposition of fines is a weaker tool than trade sanctions, including ab-
rogation of preferential trade status, which can be applied to violations of 
other provisions in the trade agreement itself.18 The TPP would be the first 
trade agreement for Canada under which labour obligations are subject to 
the main dispute settlement mechanism of the FTA.
Beyond the formal provisions of these agreements, labour unions and 
other civil society organizations doubt whether many of the countries in-
volved in the TPP will be able to live up to the minimum labour standards 
therein. They are concerned, with good reason, that other aspects of the free 
trade agreement, such as its market liberalization requirements and invest-
or protections, may adversely affect workers and peasants, exacerbating ex-
isting conflicts and thus fueling the systematic violation of workers’ rights. 
For example, in the case of the Canada–Colombia agreement, civil society 
organizations (CSOs) question the effectiveness of the labour agreement in 
the context of widespread violations of labour rights and the large number 
of murders of labour activists in Colombia.19
Similarly, Gerda van Roozendaal’s careful analysis of the impact of the 
DR–CAFTA on labour rights in Guatemala argues that the agreement rep-
resents a failed case of forced diffusion of labour standards, even though 
labour disputes may be pursued through the agreement’s main dispute reso-
lution mechanism. Van Roozendaal states the failure results from weak for-
mulation of the labour provisions and sanction mechanisms, and the lack 
of follow-up action. In a country that has experienced widespread violence 
against trade union actors and systematic violation of workers’ rights, this is 
not a surprising conclusion.20 Similar concerns exist for several of the coun-
tries involved in the TPP agreement.
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TPP labour chapter analysis
As mentioned above, the labour provisions in the TPP and other recent U.S. 
FTAs are a product of policy shifts in response to pressure from labour unions 
to improve on the NAFTA model. Since the May 10 Agreement of 2007, the 
USTR has included in its FTAs a fully enforceable obligation to “adopt and 
maintain” fundamental labour rights as stated in the ILO Declaration. This is 
sometimes referred to as the second generation of worker rights in U.S. FTAs.
Four elements of the May 10 Agreement are incorporated in the TPP 
labour chapter:
ILO fundamental rights
2. Declares that all members, even if they have not ratified the conventions in question, have an obligation 
arising from the very fact of membership in the [ILO] to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and 
in accordance with the constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject of 
those conventions, namely:
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.
Core conventions
Fundamental conventions
• Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87)
• Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98)
• Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)
• Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105)
• Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138)
• Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182)
• Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100)
• Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111)
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1. Requirement to adopt, maintain, and enforce the four fundamental 
rights named in the 1998 ILO Declaration.
2. Clarification that a country cannot defend its failure to enforce labour 
law on the basis of resource allocation or resource limitations.
3. A prohibition from lowering labour standards covered by the treaty 
in a manner affecting trade or investment.
4. Labour obligations must be enforceable through the same dispute 
settlement mechanisms, and have access to the same penalties, as 
those available for other obligations under the FTA.
The first requirement is somewhat limited because it refers to the ILO 
Declaration alone, and not the details of the eight core conventions relating 
to those fundamental rights or to the procedures found in the “follow-up” to 
the 1998 ILO Declaration. The requirement to enforce labour laws is limited 
by the necessity that non-enforcement must have occurred “in a manner af-
fecting trade or investment between the parties,” and “through a sustained 
or recurring course of action or inaction.” The following provides more de-
tailed examination of these four elements.
Requirement to adopt and maintain fundamental labour rights
Article 19.3.1 of the TPP establishes the requirement of signatories to adopt 
and maintain the four fundamental rights stated in the ILO Declaration. As 
in prior U.S. FTAs, this requirement is limited by referring to the declaration 
alone, not to the details of ILO conventions or the follow-up. Article 19.3.2 
establishes the requirement to adopt and maintain laws and regulations on 
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health. This 
article is limited by a footnote clarifying that it refers to “acceptable condi-
tions of work as determined by that Party.”21 Both articles are further limit-
ed by the requirement to demonstrate that the failure to adopt or maintain 
a specific statute or regulation affects trade or investment between the par-
ties.22 The Canada–European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) has stronger language in its labour chapter referring to 
the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda and committing to implement ILO conven-
tions that have already been ratified, as well as committing to “continued 
and sustained efforts” to ratify those ILO core conventions not yet ratified. 
The TPP presented a real opportunity to advance the language on labour 
rights, but failed to do so.
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Requirement to enforce fundamental labour rights
Article 19.5 of the TPP deals with the enforcement of labour laws. As in the 
May 10 Agreement, non-enforcement is limited to cases of a “sustained or 
recurring course of action or inaction in a manner affecting trade or invest-
ment between the parties.”23 This presents an extremely high bar for any po-
tential complaints regarding enforcement under the TPP.
Prohibition from lowering labour standards
Article 19.4, the “non derogation clause,” deals with weakening or lower-
ing labour standards to encourage trade or investment. The TPP has differ-
ent statements on 19.3.1 (fundamental rights) and 19.3.2 (acceptable condi-
tions of work). Article 19.4 (a) specifies a general prohibition on weakening 
or offering to weaken labour laws with respect to 19.3.1 (fundamental rights), 
but contains nothing with respect to 19.3.2 (acceptable conditions of work). 
Article 19.4 (b) applies only to special trade and customs areas such as ex-
port processing zones (EPZs), and specifies the obligation around non-dero-
gation with respect to both 19.3.1 and 19.3.2. This seems to imply that par-
ties to the TPP would be permitted to weaken laws around minimum wages, 
hours of work, and occupational safety and health outside of EPZs, even if 
it were clear that doing so would affect trade or investment between the 
parties. For example, member states must adopt and maintain a minimum 
wage according to 19.3.2, but they are within their rights to lower that min-
imum wage outside export processing zones in order to attract investment. 
If this is the case, it is difficult to imagine a successful TPP labour complaint 
related to acceptable conditions outside of EPZs.
Equal access to dispute settlement
While the TPP does officially offer equal access to dispute settlement for 
labour violations, there is a lengthy process of co-operation (Article 19.10), 
co-operative labour dialogue (Article 19.11), and labour consultations (Arti-
cle 19.15) before a party may request a dispute settlement panel be estab-
lished. Cases may be raised by individual workers, unions, or other civil so-
ciety actors, but are actually brought by governments. For example, unions 
in Canada and Vietnam might make a submission to Canada’s labour de-
partment on behalf of workers in Vietnam — an institutionally awkward ar-
rangement for protecting labour rights. Documenting violations will be time 
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consuming and expensive given the requirement to demonstrate an impact 
on trade or investment between the parties. The lack of reference to the de-
tails of the ILO core conventions further limits the extent to which existing 
ILO jurisprudence will be helpful in resolving disputes. On the other hand, 
the article on co-operation (19.10) is extensive, and may be a more effective 
route for raising labour standards in TPP nations because of the possibility 
of trade sanctions if co-operation fails.
Additional features of the TPP
Two additional articles of the TPP labour chapter are mostly symbolic. Article 
19.6 recognizes the goal of eliminating forced labour in TPP member coun-
try supply chains, and encourages signatories to discourage the importa-
tion of goods produced through forced labour. The second, Article 19.7, en-
courages voluntary initiatives on corporate social responsibility. It is unclear 
how either article will be effective.
Conclusion
Labour chapters in free trade agreements have not evolved significantly in 
the eight years since the May 10 Agreement in the U.S. The TPP was poten-
tially an opportunity to raise the bar even higher for labour rights, specific-
ally by referencing core ILO conventions, the “follow-up” to the ILO Declar-
ation, and the ILO Decent Work Agenda. This did not happen. For Canada, 
although the TPP labour chapter is better than previous Canadian FTAs, it 
could not hope to mediate the negative impacts on workers of modern trade 
and investment agreements. 24
The case of Mexico shows that labour chapters are ineffective when these 
agreements create such asymmetry between business and labour in nation-
al and regional processes. The U.S.–Guatemala labour case shows just how 
lengthy, expensive, and mostly ineffective the dispute resolution process 
can be. It is hardly surprising, then, that labour unions have been among 
the strongest opponents of recent trade agreements, including now the TPP. 
The weak and cumbersome labour rights dispute processes in the agree-
ment provide little comfort to workers in any of the participating countries.
Unions from nine of the 12 signatory states to the TPP have proposed 
an alternative labour chapter that builds on and improves the labour and 
dispute resolution chapters of the U.S.–Peru FTA.25 Unfortunately, while 
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business groups were regularly consulted throughout the TPP negotiating 
process, labour unions in Canada were given little opportunity to put their 
alternative proposals on the table. As such, the TPP simply reproduces an 
ineffective rights regime while further expanding a free trade model that 
has perpetuated labour rights violations in many countries.
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